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South Korean Government’s policy on the shipbuilding 
industry: transformation from the industrial policy of 
developmental state towards neo-liberal one 
 (1953-2018)
Wonchul Shin1
Professor in the Department of Sociology
Pusan National University
Abstract
Against the backdrop of the success story of the Korean shipbuild-
ing industry, numerous legends and hero stories have been created. On 
the one hand, they advocate the developmental dictatorship while high-
lighting the positive role of Park Chung-Hee and the government. Others 
have emphasized the role of Chaebol owners or entrepreneurs from a mar-
ket-oriented perspective. Strangely, the two views are often combined at 
the same time. This paper went beyond the discussion of success factors 
to examine how the relationship between the government and the market 
has changed and what difficulties and problems the shipyard workers had 
to face in the process. In particular, the paper has dealt with government’s 
policy for the shipbuilding industry during the recessions.
This article provides an overview of the Korean government’s 
policy for the shipbuilding industry and the business strategy of the Hyun-
dai Heavy Industries (hereafter, HHI), South Korea’s leading shipyard. 
Especially, the historical process of structuration of the state-market re-
lations, or the government-industry relations would be focused on. Labor 
disputes related with restructuring will be also briefly mentioned. 
The first part will investigate the historical transformations from 
the shipbuilding promotion policy of the developmental state into the 
neo-liberal policy for restructuring to deal with the shipbuilding depres-
sion. The effects and implications of such transformation on labor rela-
tions will also be noted briefly. The second part will deal with so called the 
success of the HHI, and its recent restructuring. 
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Política del Gobierno de Corea del Sur 
para la industria de la construcción naval: 
del estado desarrollista al estado neoliberal  (1953-2018)
En el contexto de la historia exitosa de la industria naval coreana, 
se han creado numerosas leyendas y personajes heroicos. Por un lado, se 
considera a la dictadura desarrollista al tiempo que se destaca el papel po-
sitivo de Park Chung-Hee y el gobierno. Otros han enfatizado el papel de 
los propietarios o empresarios de Chaebol desde una perspectiva orientada 
al mercado. Curiosamente, las dos visiones a menudo se combinan. En 
este artículo profundizamos el debate acerca de los factores de éxito para 
examinar cómo ha cambiado la relación entre el gobierno y el mercado y 
qué dificultades y problemas tuvieron que enfrentar los trabajadores del 
astillero en el proceso. En particular, en este texto analizamos la política 
del gobierno para la industria de la construcción naval durante las rece-
siones.
Este artículo proporciona una visión general de la política del go-
bierno coreano para la industria de la construcción naval y la estrategia co-
mercial de Hyundai Heavy Industries  (en adelante, HHI), el astillero líder 
de Corea del Sur. Especialmente, se centraría en el proceso histórico de 
estructuración de las relaciones entre el estado y el mercado, o las relacio-
nes entre el gobierno y la industria. Los conflictos laborales relacionados 
con la reestructuración también se mencionarán brevemente.
La primera parte investigará las transformaciones históricas de la 
política de promoción de la construcción naval del estado en desarrollo a 
la política neoliberal de reestructuración para enfrentar la depresión de la 
construcción naval. Los efectos e implicaciones de tal transformación en 
las relaciones laborales también se mencionarán brevemente. La segunda 
parte abordará el llamado éxito del HHI y su reciente reestructuración.
Palabras clave
Corea, industria naval, políticas públicas, relaciones estado-industria.
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I. Introduction 
The shipbuilding industry of South Korea (hereafter, Korea) is widely 
known for its remarkable success stories. The market shares of Korea 
started at 1.3% in 1973, rose to 9.0% in 1980, and 30.2% in 1987. Korea 
has emerged as a major player in the global shipbuilding in the late 1980s 
and maintained its leading position until now. Legends and heroism were 
spread through media articles and publications of business history brag-
ging about the success of the Korean shipyards.2 
Western scholars have also paid attention to the success of the Korean 
shipbuilding industry (Amsden 1989; Jonsson 1995). At first the relation-
ship between the state and the market has become the focus of research 
by Amsden, who introduced the Korean developmental state to Western 
readers. Amsden emphasized “a reciprocal relation between the state and 
the firm” in late industrialization, arguing that the Korean state imposed 
“certain performance standards from firms” in direct exchange for govern-
ment subsidies (Amsden 1989: 146).3 The developmental state approach, 
however, has serious flaws that downplay the contradictions and negative 
aspects inherent in developmental dictatorship (Kim 1999: 171-2). Re-
viewing the relationship between the Korean Government and each ship-
yard, including Hyundai, Daewoo, and Samsung, Kim (1999) claimed that 
the government interventions have sometimes resulted in inefficiency as 
in the Daewoo Shipbuilding case. 
Subsequent studies have focused primarily on exploring various fac-
tors of the Korean shipbuilding industry’s success. In order to build 
the state-of-the art large shipyards and to construct Very Large Crude-
Oil Carriers (VLCCs), the Korean Government and shipbuilders could 
not but borrow capital and technology from the advanced economies. 
Thus several scholars paid attention to how new shipbuilders, includ-
2 The Title of the Part II of the official history of Hyundai Heavy Industries (1998) 
is “The Legend of Hyundai Shipyard’s Founding”. 
3 Amsden attributed the presence of the discipline not to the ability of policy-mak-
ers, but to the dominant state power over the other social forces including business 
and labor classes (Amsden 1989: 147). Criticizing Amsden’s view of stressing the 
government’s role in the construction of the Hyundai shipyard (Amsden, 1989: 
81, 112), Bae (2007) argued that Park Chung-Hee government was not thorough-
ly prepared to build a large shipyard. He noted the entrepreneurial capacities of 
Hyundai and its accurate analysis of shipbuilding market trends. 
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ing Hyundai, secured capital and technology from Europe and Japan 
in the early 1970s (Bae 2002; Bae 2011), and to the background of 
decisions of European and Japanese shipyards as well (Sofue 2005; 
Kang et al. 2016). Emphasizing the timing when Korea’s shipbuilding 
industry entered the global market, some studies argued that advanced 
technology was available from European shipyards as they entered a 
declining period thus seeking another profitable source of ship equip-
ment (Bae 2011; Eich-Born and Hassink 2005).4
Other studies have focused on the formation of a shipbuilding cluster in 
the southeastern part of the Korean Peninsula (Hassink and Shin 2005; 
Shin and Hassink 2011). Todd, on the contrary, argued that Asian ship-
yards sought economies of scale through large shipyards, not taking clus-
ters into account, while the decline of European shipyards was related to 
the fault with the cluster (Todd 2011, 271).5
Many other factors may have also been related to the success of the Ko-
rean shipbuilding industry. For example, the repressive labor policy of 
the Korean Government made it possible for shipbuilders to maintain low 
labor costs for a long time before 1987 (Nam 2009, 205). The Korean 
shipyards’ own R&D and technological innovation have also deserved at-
tention (OECD 2015).6 
Research on the success factors of the Korean shipbuilding industry is 
necessary and useful to understand the industry. Questions on success fac-
tors, however, seem to make it difficult to pay attention to continuities 
and changes in the industrial policy of the Korean government, and the 
dynamic relations between the government and the industry. This paper 
aims to focus on the continuities and changes in the industrial policy of 
the Korean government. 
4 Bruno and Tenold mentioned that the long crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s 
was even “a blessing in disguise for South Korea’s shipbuilders” (Bruno and 
Tenold 2011, 217).
5 The concept of a cluster may be used vaguely, and an evolutionary approach un-
derlying the concept of a cluster’s life cycle tends to underestimate historical con-
tingencies, political aspects of industrial growth, and the role of the state as well.
6 Lee and Park (2013) refer to five success factors of Korean Shipbuilding Com-
panies such as the government’s industrial policy, Chaebol-led industrial devel-
opment, competition between Chaebols, domestic technology innovation, and 
human resource development. The Chaebol refers to a family-run conglomerate 
in Korean.
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It has been nearly 50 years since Korea entered the global shipbuilding 
market. The Korean government’s shipbuilding policy and relations with 
major shipbuilders have undergone huge changes along with the Korea’s 
changing position in the market. Starting as late-comers,  Korean ship-
builders have become leading actors, which was also accompanied by 
change in the firm’s business strategy.7 In the first decade of the 21th cen-
tury the global shipbuilding market has enjoyed an unprecedented boom, 
and then went through a long-term recession following the global finan-
cial crisis of 2008.8 Since 2010 Korea’s shipbuilding industry has also 
undergone massive reductions in facilities and workforce as well. 
The industrial policy of the developmental state has characteristics such as 
government control of foreign capital and bank sector, direct intervention 
and incubation of selected industries, authoritarian suppression of 
labor movement, and direct intervention in industrial restructuring. 
In comparison, the industrial policy of the neo-liberal state has other 
features such as capital and financial liberalization, general and indirect 
intervention in industries – for example R&D support -, emphasis on 
employment flexibility, and industrial restructuring based on so called 
market principles. The industrial policy of the Korean developmental state 
has evolved into a neo-liberal one since 1998. This article provides an 
overview of the Korean government’s policy for the shipbuilding indus-
try and the business strategy of the Hyundai Heavy Industries (hereafter, 
HHI), South Korea’s leading shipyard. 
Looking at the continuity and change of the Korean government's policy 
on the shipbuilding industry over the past 60 years, this paper reviews 
academic articles and books related to the Korean shipbuilding industry 
as well as materials published by shipbuilding companies, shipbuilders’ 
association, and government ministries.9 Korean shipbuilding statistics 
7 The classification of Cho and Porter (1986) on the competitive strategy of the 
shipbuilding industry has some limits to capture neo-liberalist trends of increas-
ing mergers and acquisitions under financialization and globalized production 
system. Taking this into account, this article adopts the term of business strategy 
in a broad sense, rather than competitive strategy.
8 The 2008 global financial crisis should be regarded as an incident that reveals an 
existing oversupply rather than a cause of the shipbuilding industry’s downturn 
(Shin, 2016). 
9 As for official business histories for the Korean shipyards, refer to Korea Ship-
building and Engineering Corporation (1969), Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., 
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presented in this paper are based mainly on annual reports of Korea Off-
shore & Shipbuilding Association. 
This paper is organized into four parts. The first section intro-
duces and reviews the  literature on the Korean shipbuilding industry. The 
second investigates will the historical transformations from the shipbuild-
ing promotion policy of the developmental state into the neo-liberal re-
structuring policy dealing with the shipbuilding recession. The different 
effects and implications of above policies on labor relations will also be 
noted. The third section deals with the success of the HHI, and its major 
restructuring since 2014. The effects of the industrial policy of the Korean 
government are checked at the corporate level, and changes in the business 
strategy are discussed as well. The final section aims to summarize the dis-
cussions of section II, III, and to present some policy implications. 
II. Trajectory of the Korean government’s policy for the shipbuilding 
industry 
 
Five periods can be distinguished in the Korean govern-
ment’s shipbuilding policy. The first period is characterized as import 
substitution (1953-1970). The support for export-led industrialization is 
a key feature of the second period (1971-1987). During the third period 
(1988-1997) the developmental state was weakened and liberalization 
and deregulation started. The fourth period is characterized by financial-
ization and globalization under a neo-liberal transformation (1998-2008), 
and the fifth period by neo-liberal restructuring of the shipbuilding in-
dustry after the 2008 global financial crisis (2009-2018).  
Import substitution policy (1953-1970) 
In the 1950s, the Rhee Syng-Man government (1948-1960) imple-
mented a planned shipbuilding project, supporting improvement of ship-
yard facilities, and promoting manpower training. Despite these efforts, 
however, the shipbuilding industry could not reach the output level of the 
end of the Japanese colonial period, and demand of domestic ships could 
not be satisfied. The Shipbuilding Promotion Act, promulgated on March 
Ltd. (1992, 1998), Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., Ltd. (2004), 
Samsung Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (2004). 
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11th, 1958, allowed subsidies for less than 40% of new vessel price, which 
was not carried out due to budgetary constraints. The Rhee government 
established the five-year shipbuilding plan (1957-1961) to build 153,000 
tons of vessels for 5 years. From 1958 to 1961 the annual average ship-
building completion was also only about 4,500 tons due to weak financial 
capacity (Korea Development Bank Research Department 1962). 
On May 16, 1961 the Park Chung-Hee government (1961-1979) 
took power through a military coup d’état, and actively pursued to pro-
mote the shipbuilding industry through the first and second five-year eco-
nomic development plans. The government planned to build 67,000 tons 
of vessels from 1962 to 1966, but the figure was only 20,000 tons until 
May 1965 (Park 2018, 23). 
Under the second five-year economic development plan (1967-
1971), the policy goal for the shipbuilding industry was to establish a 
self-sufficient base for domestic ships, and to gradually develop gradually 
an export industry. The Shipbuilding Industry Promotion Act, enacted on 
March 30th, 1967, has increased the fiscal funds loan ratio from 55% to 
85% (HHI 1992, 315). 
The funds received from Japan in the wake of the normalization 
of Korea-Japan diplomatic relations in 1965, were used to foster the ship-
building industry. Using these funds the Korean Shipbuilding and Engi-
neering Corporation (hereafter, KSEC)10 pushed for expansion of facilities 
to build 10,000 tons of ships, and built 4,000 tons of cargo ships (Bae 
2018, 85). 
The shipbuilding industry showed stable growth rates in the 
1960s. Total 4,636 gross tons of new vessels were completed in 1962, 
and 43,230 gross tons in 1971. The imports of foreign ships, however, 
increased more steeply, and the self-sufficiency of ships was only 18.2% 
in 1971. In the late 1960s the domestic demand for various fishing vessels 
increased, but the Korean shipbuilding industry could not respond to this. 
10 The KSEC was formed by Japanese capital in 1937 as Choseon Heavy Indus-
tries Inc. (CHI), to build and repair steel ships. After the defeat of Japan in the 
World War II, the CHI became a semi-state-owned enterprise and was renamed 
Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation in 1950. In 1968, the KSEC 
was privatized, retaining its name (KSEC 1969). In 1989, the Hanjin conglom-
erate took over the KSEC in bankruptcy, and set up Hanjin Heavy Industries. 
Until the huge Hyundai shipyard was established at Ulsan, the KSEC’s Young-do 
shipyard was the largest in South Korea. 
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While domestic shipyards were idle, ships were imported from abroad 
(KIMA 1984, 1445). 
In 1964 the KSEC built two 1,600-ton cargo ships adopting the 
block construction method.11 The block construction method was an inno-
vation which allowed a reduction of the workforce input, and the adoption 
of a flow work system suitable to Taylorist production management. For 
more improvements of production, however, it was necessary to increase 
capacities of docks and cranes, which were implemented only in the 1970s 
(KSEC 1969). The KSEC exported 20 tuna fishing vessels to Taiwan in 
1969, showing the potential of the Korean shipbuilding industry to grow 
into an export industry. But these exports caused a deficit of 900 million 
Korean won due to low-priced orders, aggravating the management bal-
ance of the KSEC (Bae 2007, 39). In 1971 the KSEC received orders for 
six oil carriers ranging from 20,000 to 30,000 tons from the US Gulf. The 
Korean government has promised to increase the transportation costs of 
crude oil provided by the Gulf so that the company place orders for the 
KSEC (Bae 2018, 92). 
Export-led industrialization (1971-1987)  
With the establishment of Hyundai’s Shipyard in Ulsan, Korea 
could only succeed in entering the global shipbuilding market of VLCCs. 
In the 1970s Korea’s shipbuilding industry grew dramatically with the 
support of the government’s promotion policy for heavy and chemical in-
dustry. The government’s interest in the shipbuilding industry originated 
from political and military considerations, when, according to the Nixon 
Doctrine, U.S. military presence in Korea was expected to end. The Park 
military dictatorship attempted to foster a defense industry which was 
embodied in the ‘four nuclear plant plans (Bae 2018, 90). The Hyundai 
Chaebol was in charge of the shipbuilding sector in those plans. Paying 
attention to the expanding oil tanker market, Chung Ju-Yung, the chair-
man of the Hyundai Conglomerate, actively pursued the construction of 
large shipyard. Since the Hyundai Shipyard started out as an exporter for 
11 The block construction method refers to a method in which a block is built at 
a factory or on the ground, transported to a fleet or dock, and then assembled to 
construct a ship. The size of a block is limited by the crane capacity which can 
lift it. 
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global market in 1973, Korea’s shipbuilding records have been published 
in Lloyd’s statistics.12
In March 1973, the Korean government announced ‘the long-term 
shipbuilding industry promotion plan’, according to which the Korean 
shipbuilding industry would meet domestic  demand by 1980, and export 
3.2 million tons of vessels. Another new shipbuilding industrial complex 
should be constructed at the Geoje Island. In October 1973, the KSEC 
started to construct the Okpo Shipyard in Geoje. The KSEC, however, 
could not afford the construction cost of the new shipyard, and went into 
bankruptcy. As a result, the uncompleted shipyard was taken over by the 
Daewoo Conglomerate, which completed the first dock of 1-million-ton 
class in 1981. The Jukdo shipyard built by the Korean Ocean Co., was 
also acquired by the Samsung Conglomerate. Samsung completed the first 
dock in 1979 and the second in 1983, and came to have an annual ship-
building capacity of 450,000 gross tons (Korean Entrepreneurs’ Associa-
tion 1997).
Korea accounted for 3.5% of the world’s shipbuilding comple-
tion in 1980, and has almost always exceeded 20% since 1986 (see Fig-
ure 1). In particular, Koren rapid growth occurred at a time when world 
shipbuilding market was contracting seriously since the mid-1970s. The 
world’s shipbuilding performance reached a peak of around 32.4 million 
gross tons in 1975, declining to 10 million gross tons in the 1980s. This 
meant that the growth of Korean shipbuilding industry was a disaster for 
European shipyards. On the other hand, Korea had to make it through 
with such a weak domestic market during severe recessions that the Ko-
rean government’s proactive support greatly contributed to the survival 
and growth of the industry.13 
Both the Park Chung-Hee and the Chun Doo-Hwan governments 
(1980~1987) supported shipbuilding industry through the “export fi-
12 The growth strategy of the Korean shipbuilding industry contrasted sharply 
with Brazil, which aimed at the domestic ship market and focused on domes-
tic capital. The Brazilian shipbuilding industry has virtually disappeared in the 
1990s, but is seeking to revive again with Petro bras’ oil field development (Du-
bois and Primo 2012). 
13 Bruno & Tenold argued that the long crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s was 
even “a blessing in disguise for South Korea’s shipbuilders” (Bruno and Tenold 
2011, 217). This argument is controversial, but clearly the severe recession has 
made the role of the Korean government even more important.
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Figure 1
New Shipbuilding Completion (1973-2017)
(gross ton, ratio) 
Source: Korea Offshore & Shipbuilding Association. 
nance” and “planned shipbuilding program.” Since the oil crisis of 1973, 
the payment method of ship exports has changed into “deferred pay-
ment basis.” The Export-Import Bank of Korea was launched as a public 
corporation overseen by the government in 1976. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
financial support for ship export accounted for around 80% of total export 
financing for deferred payments (HHI 1992, 436). With the planned ship-
building program, real buyers making orders at domestic shipyards were 
also provided government financial support. Total orders under the pro-
gram amounted to 199,000 gross tons in 1977, and expanded to 820,100 
in 1985, when the shipbuilding recession was most serious. Total orders 
under the program were over 4.64 million gross tons from 1976 to 1989 
(HHI 1992, 462 Table 30).
Under the developmental dictatorship, partial liberalization and 
deregulation measures have already begun. In April 1979, the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) announced a plan to change the government-led 
promotion policy for the heavy and chemical industry into a private-led 
initiative based on principles of a market economy (Cho 2016, 68). A 
group of economic officials who studied neoliberal doctrines in the United 
States were in the EPB. The new military led by Chun Doo-Hwan, which 
took office in May 1980 through cracking down the people’s movement 
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for democratization in Kwangju, accepted the so-called economic liberal-
ization measures and tried to refrain from government’s direct interven-
tion in the market. Although officially the government advocated a shift 
in industrial policy, Kim (1999) noted that planned shipbuilding program 
and export finance for deferred payments expanded in 1980s rather than 
in the 1970s. He argued that it was appropriate to view Korea in the 980s 
as a weakened developmental state in a transition period.
The Korean government’s support for the shipbuilding industry at 
this time was indispensable for the survival and growth of Korean ship-
yards.14 However, the Korean government’s support was not more favor-
able to Korean shipyards than that of European governments to their ship-
yards. Interestingly, the World Bank (IBRD) changed its previous critical 
stance against Korea’s heavy and chemical industrialization in this period. 
The HHI and the KSEC have reliably repaid interests on loans, and the 
Bank has come to regard South Korea as an important source of revenue. 
The IBRD also called for the Korean government’s intervention and sup-
port to protect its own investment (Park 2015, 91).
The Korean developmental state repressed basic labor rights, and 
at the same time restricted the employers’ right to dismiss workers at will. 
The Park government enacted the Emergency Act for National Security 
on December 27th, 1971 and imposed restrictions on the rights to bargain 
collectively and to go on strike. On December 5th, 1973, right after the 
oil shock, the government ordered emergency service for labor inspectors 
to prevent employers from dismissing workers due to reduction of facto-
ry operation. And in 1974 the labor department set up the guidelines for 
evading collective dismissals (Dong-A daily news July 18th, 1974).
In 1980 the new military led by Chun revised the Trade Union 
Act, making it a principle to unionize at enterprise level and forcing en-
terprise bargaining. The Act allowed collective bargaining crossing firms 
only when it was approved by the Government. But workers were not free 
to organize themselves into unions. Thus, except for the KSEC, until 1987 
there were no unions at all at major shipyards such as Hyundai, Daewoo, 
and Samsung (Shin 2004). 
14 The Korean government pushed for the amalgamation of small and medium 
size shipyards. Since 1973, 18 shipyards have been merged by region. By the 
merger of several small shipyards, was established Daedong Shipbuilding, which 
was the predecessor of the STX shipbuilding 
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After the second oil shock in 1979, the global market’s slow down 
led to a sharp decline in sea traffic in the early 1980s _ -2.9% in 1980, 
-4.0% in 1981, and -7.6% in 1982. (HHI 1992, 617-623). In 1985, new 
orders fell to 33.4% in tonnages and 25.2% in terms of total value. 
Officially the government’s regulation on collective dismissals 
continued. The ministry of labor sent a letter to the major associations of 
employers and managers, saying “even though facing redundancy situa-
tions, conglomerates should keep current level of employment through 
transferring workers to related companies, shortening working hours, us-
ing shift work, and also using statutory vacation and holidays.” (Kyun-
ghyang Daily News March 14th, 1983) The labor ministry demanded 
that, if they were to dismiss more than 10 workers, employers should get 
approval of regional labor administration offices. Moreover, the govern-
ment also threatened to arrest employers who dismissed workers without 
thoughtful measures. But there were doubts about real effects of the seem-
ingly strong regulations for preventing collective dismissals. A CEO of a 
manufacturing company in Busan openly said, “If workforce reduction 
is inevitable for managing the business, employers should have the right 
to dismiss workers.” (Kyunghyang Daily News September 24th, 1983) 
The number of workers in the Korean shipbuilding industry continued 
to decrease from 75,643 in 1984 to 57,000 in 1987 and less than 50,000 
in 1988. The HHI cut its workforce by 1,687 in 1985 and 5,588 in 1986 
(HHI, 1992: 629).
 
Starting liberalization and deregulation, but incomplete - Industrial 
Development Act (1986) and “Directive of rationalization of the ship-
building industry” (1989)
In a formal sense, the Industrial Development Act of 1986 aban-
doned the industrial policy of the developmental state. The Shipbuilding 
Promotion Act of 1967 was abolished, and the Industrial Development 
Act came into effect on July 1st, 1986. The new act avoided the gov-
ernment’s direct support for selective industries as much as possible, and 
pursued functional and indirect supports for technology development and 
productivity improvement in general. The enactment of the Industrial 
Development Act itself, however, was led by government officials, es-
pecially by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which could still re-
tain the authority to designate the rationalization industry according to 
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its judgment (Kim 2005). The new act can be understood as the result 
of a compromise of conflicting policy orientations between the EPB and 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Cho 2016, 69). Thus the gov-
ernment’s intervention continued, and a case in point was the “Directive 
of rationalization of the shipbuilding industry” of 1989 (HHI 1992, 216, 
238-241).
Since 1987, the global shipbuilding market has gradually im-
proved, but the Daewoo Shipbuilding and the KSEC faced bankruptcy 
in 1988 due to many factors such as operating losses, the heavy financial 
costs, and explosive labor disputes in 1987. South Korea’s twelve ma-
jor shipyards, including the Hyundai, the Daewoo, the Samsung and the 
KSEC, posted sustained losses due to the shipbuilding recession of the 
1980s. The total deficit amounted to 49.1 billion won in 1985, 88 billion 
won in 1986, 272 billion won in 1988, and 248 billion won in 1989. High 
financial costs, which amounted to 9.8 percent of the total costs, were a 
big burden (HHI 1992, 215-216).
The bailout for the Daewoo Shipbuilding was a controversial 
issue. The Daewoo Shipbuilding completed the 1-million-ton capacity 
Okpo Shipyard in 1981. As the shipbuilding recession persisted, Daewoo 
continued to record deficits especially due to the burden of the construc-
tion costs. The deficit amounted to 600 billion won in the late 1980s (Cho 
2016: 70).15 Net losses reached 145.5 billion won in 1987 and 212.76 bil-
lion won inv1988,vand interest payments exceeded 437 billion won for 
the three years since 1986 (Kim 1999, 163). 
In March 1989, the government announced a plan to rescue the 
Daewoo Shipbuilding. The Daewoo Group set aside 400 billion Korean 
won in self-rescue efforts, the state-run Korea Development Bank (KDB) 
suspend 250 billion won of its existing loans for seven years without inter-
est, and offered 150 billion won in fresh loans. Subsequent measures for 
rationalization of the shipbuilding industry were implemented. Financial 
and tax supports were provided to the Incheon Shipbuilding and the KSEC 
as well. In particular, the Directive of 1989 limited the establishment of 
new shipbuilding facilities or the expansion of existing ones until 1993, 
and measures were taken to prevent excessive competition for low-cost 
15 The Daewoo conglomerate took over the suspended Okpo shipyard from the 
KSEC, demanding the government to contribute an equivalent amount of Dae-
woo’s own investment (Kim, 1999: 161).
Anuario CEEED - Nº 12 - Año 11 - ISSN 2545-8299364
Wonchul Shin
orders among Korean shipyards (HHI 1992, 216). The Korean govern-
ment’s intervention was based on the prediction that the recession would 
end soon. 
The Directive of 1989 showed that the Korean government’s fi-
nancial support was indispensable for the industry to tide over the crisis, 
which was replicated on a larger scale in the subsequent crisis right after 
the global financial crisis of 2008. The government had the power to de-
cide whether to back up a company’s investment plan or not, and whether 
to keep a certain shipyard alive or not (Kim 1999, 154). 
Until the end of 1985, the terms of loans for deferred payments of-
fered by the Export-Import Bank of Korea were 9.6 percent annual interest 
rates, an 80 percent loan ratio, and an eight-year repayment period. This was 
adjusted to 80% of the loan ratio, 8.5 years between loans, and 8% of inter-
est rates following the level of the OECD Memorandum of Understanding 
(HHI 1992, 641). At this time, various government subsidies were being 
implemented in Europe (Stopford and Barton 1986), and in financial terms 
Korea was at a disadvantage. In 1980, Korea’s interest rate was around 8 
percent, but Japan had 2-4 percent, Italy, Sweden and Spain 6-7 percent, 
and Korea had a shorter repayment period of eight years (Park 2018, 306).
As soon as the Directive of 1989 was released, in 1994, Kore-
an shipbuilders fiercely sought to construct new docks and expand those 
already in existence. The Samsung Heavy Industries expanded a second 
dock and built a third dock. The HHI completed the eighth and ninth docks, 
and the Halla Heavy Industries started building the Samho shipyard which 
began operations in 1995. As a result, Korea’s new shipbuilding comple-
tion increased from 3.36 million tons in 1988, to 8.63 million tons in 1998, 
and its global market share reached 41% in 1999 (Figure 1).16
Total investments to the shipyard facilities increased from 166 
billion won in 1990 to 1227.1 billion won in 1994, 1386.2 billion won in 
1995, and 1397.4 billion won in 1996, respectively (Figure 2). 
In the OECD multilateral shipbuilding negotiations of March 
1994, the European Union (EU) and other countries urged the Korean 
government to curb the expansion of facilities, arguing that global over-
supply would deepen due to the increase in the capacities of the Korean 
16 Compared to the increase in the new shipbuilding completion, the employment 
in the shipbuilding industry showed a slight increase. The workforce increased 
from 57148 persons in 1987 to 77799 persons in 1997.
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shipyards.17 The Korean government announced that it had a plan to curb 
overcapacities through administrative guidance. At the OECD shipbuild-
ing conference in 1995, however, the Korean government argued that they 
could not regulate the expansion of shipyard facilities (Cho 2017, 427-8). 
Cho interpreted that the deregulation of the shipbuilding industry was pro-
moted as a result of the strengthening of the voice of market-oriented bu-
reaucrats in the Kim Young-Sam administration (1993-1998) (Cho 2017). 
In this case the government might interpret that noninterference would be 
more favorable to the Korean shipbuilding industry as a whole. In gener-
al, it seems that the Korean developmental state has weakened and been 
approaching toward neoliberal one from 1988 to 1997 (Ji 2011). In terms 
of the policy for shipbuilding industry, however, practices and heritages 
of the developmental state remained strong. One such example were the 
bailouts through direct government interventions in bankrupt shipyards 
such as the Daewoo shipbuilding. 
17 South Korea became a member of the OECD Working Party on Shipbuilding 
in October 1990, and signed a multilateral agreement in July 1994, which was to 
forbid the government subsidies to shipbuilders (Jonsson 1995, 62). As for the 
shipbuilding disputes between EU and Korea see Glen (2006).
Figure 2
Investment in shipbuilding facilities in Korea
10 mn. Korean Won 
Source: Korea Development Bank. 
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From Asian financial crisis of 1997 to the global financial 
crisis of 2008 
On January 1st, 1995 Korea became a full member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), thus making it difficult for the government 
to regulate foreign capital. Moreover, under the terms of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout in 1997 financial crisis, the U.S. Treasury 
and Wall Street called for allowing foreign financial institutions to set up 
local subsidiaries, and being able to carry out mergers and acquisitions 
(Ji 2011, 239-240). Under the new Foreign Investment Promotion Act of 
November 17th, 1998, all types of foreign direct investment such as hostile 
mergers and acquisitions were permitted (Thurbon and Weiss 2006, 7). 
The Asian financial crisis also served as a turning point towards “the flex-
ibility of labor market”, which neo-liberal economic officials had already 
pursued in Korea. On January 13, 1998, at a meeting with the leader of 
the Federation of Forean Trade Unions, Michel Camdessus, the Managing 
Director of the IMF, emphasized the inevitability of collective dismissals 
in a competitive economic system. In February 1998, a new clause on 
dismissal for managerial reasons was implemented, thus prompting man-
agers to carry out layoffs, and a series of severe labor disputes on collec-
tive dismissals happened in the Young-do shipyard of the Hanjin Heavy 
Industries (Shin, 2018). 
During the boom of the 2000s, Korean major shipbuilders ex-
panded their shipyard facilities in Korea, and at the same time aggres-
sively increased overseas investments. Korean shipbuilders’ domestic 
facility investment grew very sharply in the mid-2000s, exploding right 
before the financial crisis. It rose from 741.7 billion won in 2003 to 1.66 
trillion won in 2006, and surged to 2.99 trillion won in 2007 and 3.6621 
trillion won in 2008 (see Figure 2). In addition, South Korea’s largest 
shipbuilding companies have accelerated their overseas expansion since 
the mid-2000s. According to the Export-Import Bank of Korea’s Overseas 
Investment Statistics, the amount of overseas investments by South Kore-
an shipbuilders exceeded $75 million in 2005, over $320 million in 2006, 
and $340 million in 2007, and finally hit a whopping $860 million in 2008.
The Korean major shipyards operated ship block plants overseas 
(in the case of Samsung and Daewoo), or acquired overseas shipyards (in 
the case of Daewoo’s Mangalia shipyard in Romania and STX’s acquisi-
tion of European shipyards). Moreover, STX and Hanjin built and operat-
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ed their own shipyards at Subic in Philippines and at Dalian in China. In 
addition, targeting the marine structures related to the development of oil 
resources, Daewoo established a joint venture with Russia’s Zvezda ship-
yard, and Samsung formed a joint partnership with a Brazilian shipyard. 
In the wake of the financial crisis, however, STX and Hanjin’s overseas 
investment ended in a disastrous failure. Daewoo also had to dispose of 
the Mangalia shipyard (see Table 1).
China’s economic growth was behind the global boom of shipping 
and shipbuilding in the 2000s. At the same time, deepening financializa-
tion and over-investment were accelerating the boom. Korea’s shipping 
Table 1
Overseas business investment by Korean shipbuilders
Company Location Yardlocation 
Business
domain
Beginning 
of 
operation 
Status  
Samsung China  
Ningbo ship block 1997 operating
Rongsheng ship block 2007 operating
Daewoo 
China Shandong ship block 2005 operating
Romania Mangalia shipbuilding 1997
acquired 
by Damen 
shipyards 
group in 2017
Hyundai 
Mipo Vietnam Vinashin ship repairing 1999 operating 
Hanjin Philippine Subic shipbuilding 2003 bankruptcy and on sale 
STX 
China Dalian shipbuilding 2007 shut down in 2013 
Finland Turku shipbuilding 2007
acquired by 
Meyer Werft in 
2014
France St. Nazaire shipbuilding 2007
acquired by 
Fincantery in 
2017
Vietnam Vung Tau shipbuilding 2011
acquired by 
Fincantery in 
2017
Source: OECD 2015. p. 17 Table 6, and various articles of Korean 
newspapers.   
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and shipbuilding industries were also going through financialization. The 
so called ship investment company system was introduced in 2002 with 
the aim of boosting ship investment. The size of ship funds raised between 
2004 and 2011 reached 6.9146 trillion won. STX shipbuilding was a good 
example attaining rapid growth riding on the trend of financialization. 
STX grew into a large conglomerate in a short period of time through cor-
porate mergers and acquisitions before falling apart right after the global 
financial crisis. Expanding its business scope, STX actively utilized as-
set-backed securities, and initial public offerings (IPO) seeking capital 
gains. On the other hand, the Korean mid-sized shipyards, which entered 
the global market in the mid-2000s, got investments from overseas capital 
such as Goldman Sachs and Macquarie18 as well as from private equity 
funds and secondary financial institutions in Korea (Shin 2016). 
In the 2000s the focus of the Korean government’s support for 
the shipbuilding industry has shifted to indirect support for research and 
development investment. In 2012, the OECD’s Council Working Party 
on Shipbuilding launched a review project on government support mea-
sures for the shipbuilding industry. The review of Korea was submitted 
and discussed on November 25th, 2014 (OECD 2015). The OECD WP6 
report assessed that the Korean shipbuilding industry’s prominence in the 
high value-added sector has been supported by R&D spending and skilled 
labor. It pointed out that despite the 2008 economic crisis, large compa-
nies continued to invest in innovation, and new R&D facilities were under 
construction. On the other hand, it noted that the number of college-edu-
cated R&D and engineering workers among shipbuilding workforce was 
growing, and that shipbuilders were investing in training to strengthen 
workers’ capabilities and their ties with universities. Even during the 
recession, the Korean government continued to provide support for the 
shipbuilding industry’s R&D investment. The R&D investment by the big 
shipyards dropped dramatically in 2015 and 2016, when restructuring of 
big yards being carried out on a large scale. The South Korean govern-
ment continues to invest in R&D unlike private conglomerates. A gov-
ernment-run Korea Research Institute of Ships and Ocean Engineering 
18 Goldman Sachs invested $50 million in the SPP shipbuilding, and used the put 
option to recoup all of its investment. Macquarie set up an investment company 
to become the second largest shareholder of the SLS shipyard.
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(KRISO)’s investment in human resources has also not decreased.19 The 
R&D investments through the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy and 
the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries seem to be useful for the 
industry to maintain its competitiveness.
Global shipbuilding recession and restructuring of shipbuilding in-
dustry 
The global shipbuilding recession following right after the global 
financial crisis of 2008, however, has forced the Korean government to 
take the lead in restructuring the Korean shipbuilding industry. The gov-
ernment’s restructuring policy was determined through “the emergency 
meeting for economy” led by the President Lee Myung-Bak (2008-2013). 
The Lee administration pushed the closure of the small and medium-size 
shipyards based on “market principles”.20 In 2009, the government pro-
posed a policy of “ongoing restructuring led by creditor financial institu-
tions” with a focus on retrieving loans. Over twenty small and medium 
shipyards have been shut down or sold between 2009 and 2013 in Korea 
(OECD’s Council Working Party on Shipbuilding 2015, 14 Table 3). 
As for big shipyards, the government decided to provide financial 
support selectively through a profitability assessment, pushing for facility 
reduction in order to address oversupply in the shipbuilding industry. Ko-
rea’s three shipbuilding giants pushed for expansion of the offshore plants 
sector in the face of the shipbuilding recession. Also the Lee Myung-Bak 
and the Park Geun-Hye governments (2013-2016) had actively encour-
aged Korean shipbuilders to expand the offshore plants sector as an alter-
native for shrinking shipbuilding. However, as orders for offshore plants 
have fallen sharply since 2014, extensive restructuring of large shipyards 
has also started. The Park administration called major shipyards to cut jobs 
of regular workers hired directly by 32 percent, from 62,000 to 42,000, 
and to reduce the shipbuilding docks by 23 percent from 31 to 24 between 
2015 and 2018. In particular, in order to secure financial support from the 
government-controlled KDB, Daewoo Shipbuilding was forced to reduce 
19 As for detailed R&D statistics refer to annual reports of Korea Offshore & 
Shipbuilding Association. 
20 More than 20 small and medium-sized shipyards were shut down or sold be-
tween 2009 and 2013. As for details, see OECD (2015). p. 14, Table 3.
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its shipbuilding capacity by 30 percent and the number of its direct work-
ers by 41 percent to 5,500 by 2018.21 
In general, labor unions in the shipyards seemed to fail to respond 
effectively to the government’s financially-driven restructuring policy. 
Over tens of thousands of workers, including regular workers at small and 
middle shipyard, and internal subcontract workers at big yards, have lost 
their jobs and been driven to the streets. Regular workers at major ship-
yards could not but choose ‘voluntary redundancy’ and remaining workers 
were forced to accept wage cuts.  
III. Emergence, growth, and restructuring of the HHI (1973-2018) 
This section outlines the HHI’s growth into the world’s largest 
shipyard and the reorganization process since the 2008 global crisis.22 The 
history of the HHI can be divided into four periods; emergence and sur-
vival (1974-1983); growth and expansion (1984-1997); upgrading under 
shipbuilding boom (1998-2008); and finally restructuring after the global 
financial crisis (2009-2018).23 This section does not deal evenly with the 
whole period. Instead it focusses on the effects of the Korean govern-
ment’s policy to foster the industry, and also on the effects of the business 
strategy of the Hyundai on employment relations. Finally, it also notes 
the transformation of the ownership and governance structure of the HHI 
around a new holding company established in 2017. 
 
Korean developmental state and emergence of the HHI (1974-1983) 
The shipbuilding division at the Hyundai E&C was established 
in March 1970. Four years later, in November 1974, the HHI succeeded 
to deliver the VLCC No. 1, when the HHI entered the global ship export 
21 This description is based on press releases from Korean government ministries, 
including the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. 
22 On December 28, 1973, the shipbuilding division of Hyundai Engineering & 
Construction became an independent corporation and was launched as the Hyun-
dai Shipbuilding Heavy Industries Co., which was renamed Hyundai Heavy In-
dustries Co. later. In this paper those names will not be distinguished, but labeled 
as HHI.  
23 HHI (1998) divided its history into establishment period (1974-78), take-off 
period (1979-83), growth period (1984-89), and maturity period (1990-97).
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market. Official History of the HHI claimed that the Hyundai shipyard is 
a “business driven by the independent judgment of private companies”, 
“proved the inefficiency of government intervention” and grew “out of 
thorough international competition based on market principles.” (HHI 
1992, 129-130). The chairman Chung also said that he had been consid-
ering entering the shipbuilding industry since around 1969, regardless of 
the government’s recommendation. However, he did not think over ship-
building, but only of constructing just ship blocks for shipyards overseas 
(HHI 1992, 90-99).
In June 1970, the Park administration drafted a plan for four ma-
jor plants, including foundry, special steel, heavy machinery, and a ship-
yard. At first, Korea asked Japan for funding and technical support for 
the construction of the large shipyard in July 1970 (Bae 2007, 28). But 
Japan refused as a Japanese investigation team reported that establishing 
a 200,000 dead weight tons’ class shipyard in Korea was unreasonable, 
and recommended that Korea should start from 20,000 dwt class vessels 
(HHI 1992, 318). Then, President Park put pressure on Hyundai to build 
a large shipyard (Park 2018, 46-49). Eventually Hyundai obtained loans 
from several banks of England, Spain, France, West Germany and Swe-
den. The first and most important creditor was Barclays Bank of England, 
and repayment of all the debts was guaranteed by the Korean government 
(Park 2016, 445; Kang et al. 2016, 85-88). For constructing the shipyard, 
the Korean government also invested $ 10 million, the same amount as 
Hyundai’s (Kim 1999). In order to build a large shipyard and receive an 
order for a tanker from abroad, Korea desperately needed foreign capi-
tal, technology and reputation. Several European shipbuilding companies 
showed interest in the construction of the new yard as an opportunity to 
sell their shipbuilding technology and equipment. Proposals from s,ever-
al firms, including West Germany’s A. G. Weser and Denmark’s Odense 
Shipyard were reviewed, but eventually A&P Appledore was selected as 
a partner. In September 1971, Hyundai signed an agency agreement with 
A&P Appledore24 for technical support and to secure ship orders (HHI 
1992, 326-327; Park 2016, 442; Park 2018, 59-60). Hyundai has agreed to 
pay A&P Appledore $ 176.4 million for ship design and technical support, 
24 A&P Appledore was a joint venture of two British shipbuilders - Austin & Pick-
ersgill and Appledore Shipbuilders Ltd. -, which were actively seeking overseas 
business opportunities as a new profit source (Kang et al. 2016, 86). 
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and 0.5% of the new shipbuilding price in exchange for securing orders 
(HHI 1992, 326; Park 2018, 60-63).
The facilities and materials for the construction of the yard were 
procured through loans of more than $51 million from the UK, Spain, 
France, West Germany and Sweden.25 These lending countries delivered 
welding machines, presses, cranes, and other equipment. Thus the initial 
financing was accomplished mainly through supplier credits (Kang et al. 
2016, 94). Shipyard managers and engineers from Europe including Kurt 
J. W. Schou from Denmark-based Odense shipyard26 were also HHI’s con-
sultants in its early days (HHI 1992, 344). 
HHI learnt the construction technology for the shipyard from Jap-
anese Kajima Construction and began sending shipbuilding technology 
trainees to the Kawasaki Heavy Industries in December 1972 (HHI 1992, 
343). In 1973, the HHI signed a technical consulting contract with Ka-
wasaki that included ship design drawings (Kang et al. 2015, 441). The 
production method of the Scott Lithgow was not applicable to Hyundai. 
The Scottish shipyard used 50-ton jib crane to build the VLCC on a slop-
ing berth without a grave dock. Moreover, in Britain ship construction was 
carried out without production design and still in a craft system premised 
on the skilled craftsmen.27 Thus HHI imported ‘production design’ from 
Kawasaki, and had to pledge that they would use Kawasaki products for 
major machinery and ship propellers in addition to paying consulting fees 
(Bae 2007). All ships from No. 3 to No. 9 were equipped with turbines 
manufactured by Kawasaki (HHI 1992, 373). 
HHI completed the construction of its hull plant in March 1973, 
and operated its first goliath crane in September 1973. The completion 
ceremony of the Hyundai shipyard was held on June 28th, 1974, along 
25 See HHI (1992), p. 399, Table 23 for specific details of the shipyard’s construc-
tion funds. This table is translated into English in Kang et al. (2015), p. 437. As 
for details of foreign loan, refer to HHI (1992), p. 399, Table 24. 
26 Until April 1976 Mr. Schou served as the first president for about three and 
a half years (HHI, 1992: 395). He was awarded a medal by the South Korean 
government in May 1976 for his contribution to the development of the Korean 
shipbuilding industry (Park 2018, 402). About 30 years later, a Korean former 
president of HHI acted as a consultant for the management at Odense Steel Ship-
yard in 2002 (Poulsen et al. 2018, 729). This episode symbolizes the dynamic 
change in the global shipbuilding industry in the late 20th century. 
27 See Kang et al. (2015, 2016) for the limitations of Scott Lithgow’s production 
method of VLCC at this time.
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with the christening ceremony for VLCC No. 1 and 2 (HHI 1992, 949).28 
The HHI delivered six VLCCs in 1976, which was far ahead of the per-
formance of the major UK shipyards, such as Swan Hunter, Scott Lithgow 
and Harland & Wolf. The HHI proved that it learned a lot quickly from its 
initial trial and error (Kang et al. 2015, 451-453).29 Behind the HHI’s early 
success in learning shipbuilding technology and building ships, was the 
presence of abundant Korean engineers graduated from college. 
Since 1976, the pre-fitting technique of Kawasaki shipyard has 
been introduced, and equipment were installed during the assembly of 
large hull. However, by 1979, the portion of pre-fitting was only 35%, and 
by 1989 it had steadily improved since the 1980s, with the portion reach-
ing 75% (HHI 1992, 816-817).
Under the developmental dictatorship, workers could not orga-
nize themselves at the Hyundai shipyard until 1987, and even the joint 
labor-management council did not exist. The internal subcontracting ar-
rangements in the Hyundai shipyard evolved under these political condi-
tions. Then, the shipbuilding workers’ riots in September 1974 demand-
ing the abolition of the subcontracting arrangements occurred under the 
despotic labor control practices of the shipyard. Due to the severe labor 
shortages at the early stages of the shipyard, the Hyundai management 
had promised incoming workers that they would be treated as direct hired 
regular workers. The management’s breach of the promise triggered work-
ers’ outrage. On September 19th, 1974, some 300 workers in the hull shop 
took actions first, demanding the abolition of the delegate control system. 
Soon about 3,000 workers went through the police line and burnt the flag 
of the HHI at the main gate and destroyed the windows and furniture of 
the main office building. Raging workers threw stones to the CEO, Chung 
28 The simultaneous push for shipyard construction and shipbuilding could have 
increased the utility of investment, but this resulted in numerous industrial acci-
dents, which left many workers dead or injured. According to the official history 
of HHI, more than 3,000 industrial accidents have occurred, and about 60 peo-
ple have died until March 1973 when a new safety management department was 
established. However, in 1974, there were 22 deaths from industrial accidents, 
1,156 seriously injured and 1,536 minor injuries. The official history states that 
industrial accidents have decreased since 1978, but 12 people died in 1978, 17 in 
1979 and 17 in 1980 in the shipyard (HHI 1992, 364).
29 After the christening ceremony for VLCC Lines 1 and 2 ended in June 1974, 
even a large block unassembled remained in the yard (HHI, 1992: 355-358). 
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Ju-Yung, who had avowed to insist on the original delegate control system 
(Kim 2006). The military police cracked down on the riots and arrested 
877 workers, and imprisoned 20 of them. Eventually management com-
pleted the system in the whole shipyard in the late October 1974, when 
regular workers totaled 3,929 and  internal subcontract workers, 10,852 
respectively. Since then the proportion of internal subcontract workers in 
production workforces always exceeded over 60% until the late 1970s 
(Shin, 2003).
HHI was awarded orders for 12 VLCCs, totaling 3 million dwt un-
til March 1974 (HHI 1992, 337). Between early 1967 and early 1974, total 
value of tanker orders worldwide increased almost eight times, from 25 
million dwt to 196 million dwt (Kang et al. 2015, 431). The overheating 
of the market was a favorable condition for HHI to enter it. However, a se-
vere depression started off right after the first oil shock and HHI failed to 
win any orders for VLCCs for next 12 years. In addition some ship owners 
have refused to take over three tankers.30 Hyundai conglomerate set up 
Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. to buy the above three tankers (HHI 1992, 
380-381), and the Korean government asked the U.S. Gulf to entrust them 
half of oil shipping for South Korea to HMM. In addition, since 1975 the 
Korean government implemented a planned shipbuilding program to pro-
vide the company with loans covering up to 90 percent of the shipbuilding 
costs at very low interest rates.  
Among the planned shipbuilding program orders from 1976 to 
1980, Hyundai had 557,440 GT, which amounted to the 67.2 percent of 
the total (HHI 1992, 463 Table 32). Orders won through the program ac-
counted for about 15 percent of HHI’s new orders, and helped the yard to 
tide over the severe depression. Since 1972, the government has expanded 
export financing for deferred payments, which had no advantage over Eu-
ropean shipyards, but was a must-have system (HHI 1992, 391-392). With 
the establishment of the Export-Import Bank of Korea in 1976, the annual 
amount of export financing was increased every year to reach 1124.2 bil-
lion won in 1984 (HHI 1992, 462-463).
In 1974 and 1975, HHI tried to overcome the recessions by chang-
ing its products strategy, receiving orders for multi-purpose cargo carriers, 
bulk carriers and roll-on/roll-off ships (Kang et al. 2016, 99-100; HHI 
30 By Jun 1975 cancellations worldwide totaled 115 vessels of about 28 million 
dwt (Kang et al. 2015: 443 n. 71). 
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1992, 384-386, 450-458).31 Financial costs, however, have become a big 
burden, as in 174 and 1975 interest rate cost rose from 2 billion won to 10 
billion won (HHI 1992, 400-401).
Hyundai Chaebol’s entry into the rising Middle East construction 
market with abundant oil dollars was instrumental to overcome the crisis. 
Hyundai won an order to build an ASRY (Arab Shipbuilding & Repair 
Yard) in Bahrain and also an order to expand a naval base in Saudi Arabia 
at the end of 1975 (HHI 1992, 428). In 1976, Hyundai succeeded in win-
ning an order for the $931 million project of constructing Jubail industrial 
harbor and offshore structures (HHI 1998, 65). Profits accruing from sales 
of steel structures’ sales for the Jubail harbor contributed greatly to the im-
provement of balance sheets. The HHI posted a net profit of 141.7 billion 
won in 1977 and 86.8 billion won in 1978 (HHI 1992, 484-487, 592).32
Growth and expansion (1984-1997) 
The Chun Doo-Hwan government took over power through mili-
tary coup’ de eta in May 1980. The new government violently carried out 
a so called investment adjustment in the heavy and chemical industries, 
which did not have a significant impact on the Korean shipbuilding indus-
try. When the government implemented the floating exchange rate system 
in 1980, the won exchange rate against the U.S. dollar fell from 484 won 
in 1979 to 748.80 won in 1982. This exchange rate fall improved HHI’s 
management. In 1983, it won orders for 66 vessels of 2.075 million tons, 
accounting for 10.6 percent of new worldwide orders (HHI 1992, 546-
547) 1985 was the worst year of the shipbuilding recession. HHI therefore 
tried to diversify its business into non-shipbuilding sectors such as plant 
manufacturing, engines, robots, heavy machinery, and steel structures 
31 In August 1979, the HHI first began to build a Korean-type destroyer (HHI, 1992: 
664). 
32 Todd noted the advantages of South Korea’s Chaebol, the conglomerates oper-
ating shipyards which, unlike family-owned British shipyards, actively pursued 
growth and innovation (Todd, 2011: 266 n. 23). It is true that Korea’s Chaebol 
have made large-scale investments possible and contributed to overcoming the 
recession through business diversification. The Odense shipyard was also owned 
by Møller family and could survive longer than other European shipyards because 
of “the strong position of the expanding and diversified conglomerate of Maersk.” 
(Poulsen et al., 2018: 721, 725). 
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(Kim 1999, 265; HHI 1992, 617). The shipbuilding business accounted 
for about 55 percent of the HHI`s total sales at the end of 1986. The figure, 
however, was much higher than the 9.4 percent for the Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries of Japan (HHI 1992, 665).
The HHI has built 131 bulk carriers of 4.44 million tons, 29 Crude 
Oil Carriers of 2.18 million tons, and 46 multipurpose carriers of 0.88 
million tons during the first 12 years. Classifying by shipping company, 
the Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM) accounted for the largest share, 36 
ships with 1.43 million tons, followed by Kuwait’s UASC Corp. with 37 
ships and 750,000 tons (HHI 1992, 689). Although apparently HHI has 
grown through an export-oriented strategy, the HMM owned by Hyundai 
Chaebol made an important contribution which allowed HHI to overcome 
the long recession since 1974. 
HHI established a block assembly system from the early days of 
the shipyard. The HHI has applied optical tracking and numerical contr 
(HHI 1992, 805-806). Various design drawings were imported from Eu-
rope and Japan (Park, 2018: 415). In 1975 the Viking System developed 
in Sweden was introduced for photo marking and cutting, and in 1981 Au-
tokon System was imported from Norway (HHI 1992, 813-814). Welding 
automation has been expanded from plane work to curved work and from 
in-plant work to outside work (Hong 1982). HHI still purchased many 
technologies from foreign countries in the 1980s, but has also established 
its own research institute, the Hyundai welding technology research in-
stitute in November 1983. In October 1984, HHI completed its own ship 
ocean research and development institute (HHI 1992, 649-654). 
Hyundai Heavy Industries introduced the Moss-type LNG carri-
er technology from Norway to build the first LNG carrier in 1991 (HHI 
1992, 819), and delivered its first LNG carrier in June 1994. HHI complet-
ed the 8th and 9th dock in November 1995, and expanded its automated 
facilities. In the 1990s, HHI’ share of the global new shipbuilding market 
rose steadily from 11.3% in 1990 to 14.0% in 2000. 
In the Hyundai shipyard, workers again challenged the internal 
subcontracting arrangements through the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle, 
as the general strikes and sit-downs across the South Korea during the 
summer of 1987 came to be known. Following the retreat of the military 
government forced by the massive demonstrations demanding democracy 
across the country in June 1987, the workers’ strikes and sit-ins burst out 
almost all over the large factories and shipyards, and their main demands 
Anuario CEEED - Nº 12 - Año 11 - ISSN 2545-8299 377
South Korean Government’s policy on the shipbuilding industry: 
transformation from the industrial policy of 
developmental state towards neo-liberal one (1953-2018)
were wage increases and union recognition. In the Hyundai shipyard 
workers continued the strike, sit-downs and street demonstrations for 56 
days from July 28 to September 21 of 1987. Besides the demands for wage 
increases, recognition of the new democratic workers’ union, and the ab-
olition of control for workers’ hair, the workers asked that the subcontract 
workers should be directly hired by the Hyundai shipyard. Finally in 1988 
management and the HHI workers union concluded the special agreement 
for the transfer of the subcontract workers and the previous internal sub-
contracting companies were almost eliminated and disappeared from the 
shipyard in 1989 (Shin, 2003). 
The enterprise level union was organized in the Hyundai shipyard 
through the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle and became a main actor in labor 
management relations at the yard (Shin 2004). Since 1987 labor disputes 
over the shop floor control continued and as working conditions improved 
sharply the turnover rate of the regular workers declined almost to zero. 
Faced with these new conditions, management stopped hiring new regu-
lar workers and began to increase the subcontracting work with a view to 
securing numerical labor flexibilities and preventing the growth of union 
organization. In the Hyundai shipyard 1,881 subcontract workers were al-
ready employed by 339 subcontracting companies by 19 January 1991. The 
proportion of the subcontract workers in relation to the total production 
workforce in the Hyundai Shipyard continued to increase every year from 
8.6% in 1991 to 31.7% in 1996, and even to 50.5% in 2000 (Shin, 2003). 
Upgrading under shipbuilding boom (1998-2008)
The Korean economy was suffering from the 1997 financial cri-
sis, but HHI rather took advantage of the yen’s fall. It set its 1998 order 
target at $9.3 billion, which was a 29 percent increase in relation to 1997, 
and its total sales at 6.5 trillion won, which would be a 14.6 percent. The 
Chairman, Chung Ju-yung, officially resigned in May 2000, and HHI was 
separated from Hyundai Group in 2001. Chung Mong-joon, the sixth son 
of the Chung Ju-yung inherited HHI. He had already been inaugurated as 
CEO of the HHI at the age of 31 in 1982. 
HHI changed its Mipo Dockyard Co. into new shipyard in 1996, 
and the Hyundai-Mipo emerged as a strong player in the mid-sized ship-
building market. In 2002, HHI acquired bankrupt Halla Heavy Industries 
and operated as Hyundai Samho Shipyard. 
Anuario CEEED - Nº 12 - Año 11 - ISSN 2545-8299378
Wonchul Shin
Figure 3
Business Performance of the HHI     
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Source: HHI Trade Union (2016). 
In terms of orders by shipyard just before the global financial 
crisis, HHI secured 361 ships, 13.8 million CGTs; Hyundai Mipo, 264 
ships, 10.5 million CGTs; and Hyundai Samho, 133 ships and 5.1 million 
CGTs. Each company ranked first, fourth and fifth in the world respec-
tively. HHI had secured enough orders, largely of high value added ships 
such as containers, LNG carriers and tankers, by 2012 (Clarkson, Ship-
yard Orderbook Monitor October 2008).
During the shipbuilding boom of the 2000s, HHI continued to 
grow rapidly. Between 2002 and 2008 total sales rose from 8.1341 tril-
lion won to 19.9571 trillion. Operating profits also rose, from to 2.262 
trillion won to 454.5 billion over the same period (Figure 3). Due to the 
shipbuilding boom, HHI’s overall employment rose from 34205 in 2002 
to 44390 in 2008. But during the same period the actual number of direct 
hired production workers declined from 17,317 to 15,560. The number of 
internal subcontract workers increased from 16433 to 19616, in order to 
respond to the increased work load (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4
Employment and new shipbuilding completion in HHI 
(2001-2018)
(person, CGT)
Source: Korea Offshore & Shipbuilding Association.
Global shipbuilding recession and restructuring politics 
HHI’s new shipbuilding completion increased from 2.118 million 
CGT in 2001 to 3.663 million in 2008 before plunging into 1.774 million 
in 2018. HHI expanded its offshore plant business as a way to overcome 
the shipbuilding recession. Total sales of offshore plant projects more than 
tripled between 2008 and 2014, but HHI lacked offshore plant design 
technologies, and the self-sufficiency rate of equipment and materials did 
not exceed 20 percent (Park 2019). Losses from offshore plants business 
caused HHI massive operating losses in 2014 and 2015 (Figure 3). 
The HHI’s total number of employees fell from 69,356 in 2014 to 
25,952 in 2018, a trend which also reflects the impact of the spin-offs in 
2015. It is noteworthy that the main targets of mass layoffs were internal 
subcontract workers, whom HHI had increased during the super boom, 
and during 2009-2014 in order to increase offshore plant construction 
(Figure 4).
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Internal subcontract workers jumped to 40,836 in 2014, but in 
five years dropped into 11,411 due to full-fledged workforce reductions 
(Figure 4). This indicates that the main victim of the last shipbuilding 
recession was internal subcontract workers. The labor union of the ship-
yard, mainly composed of direct hired production workers, was unable to 
effectively resist mass layoffs of internal subcontract workers led by the 
management. On the other hand, some direct hired workers were forced 
to choose a so called ‘voluntary redundancy’ program. As mentioned in 
section II, the government’s restructuring policy also played an important 
role in weakening the resistance of workers against the above job cuts.
The ownership and governance structure of HHI has changed into 
a financial-capital-friendly form. The HHI was reorganized into a holding 
company system, which sought to further strengthen the Chung family’s 
control over the HHI Group. In April 2017, Hyundai Electric and Energy 
System, Hyundai Construction Equipment and Hyundai Robotics were 
spun off from HHI. On March 30, 2018, Hyundai Robotics changed its 
name to HHI Holding Co.  
The merger of HHI and Daewoo Shipbuilding is now under way 
as part of the privatization of Daewoo Shipbuilding owned by the KDB. 
A new interim holding company called Korea Shipbuilding & Marine En-
gineering Co., which would be owned by HHI Holding Co. and KDB 
together, is currently being pushed forward. HHI is under control of 
Hyundai Heavy Industries Holdings, which also own Hyundai Oilbank, 
Hyundai Electric and Energy Systems, Hyundai Construction Equipment, 
and Hyundai Global Service since 2017 (Figure 5). The newly established 
interim holding company would control HHI, Hyundai Samho, Hyundai 
Mipo, and Daewoo Shipbuilding as subsidiaries all together. 
In sum, the emergence and growth of HHI was the result of a 
joint venture between the state and Hyundai Chaebol. During the early 
days of the shipyard the Korean developmental state helped HHI attract 
capital and technology from abroad. During the recessions following after 
the first oil shock, the developmental state made up for the shortfall of 
new shipbuilding demands through planned shipbuilding. The Hyundai 
Conglomerate was able to set up a shipping company on its own, and 
also reduce risks in the shipbuilding industry through business diversifi-
cation. In the last shipbuilding crisis due to the global financial crisis of 
2008, the government managed to force HHI to downsize facilities and 
reduce manpower through  financial control. The privatization of Daewoo 
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Figure 5
HHI Group after Business Restructuring 
Source: Hyundai Heavy Industries Group (2018). Corporate Governance 
Reform & Dividend Policy.  
Shipbuilding into the HHI group – even though the KDB holds a stake 
in the new holding company – would mean that the last legacy of the 
developmental state would disappear. In addition, it means that Chung 
family’s ownership and control over the Korean shipbuilding industry 
will be strengthened and more sophisticated.33 However, it is questionable 
whether corporate governance based on family ownership is still suitable 
for this larger globalized business. 
IV. Concluding remarks
Numerous legends and heroic stories have been created against 
the backdrop of the success story of the Korean shipbuilding industry. On 
the one hand, they advocate the developmental dictatorship, highlighting 
the positive role of Park Chung-Hee and the government. Others have em-
33 Chung Mong-joon is the largest shareholder of the HHI, and his son, Chung 
Ki-sun is in charge of management as vice president of the HHI. 
Anuario CEEED - Nº 12 - Año 11 - ISSN 2545-8299382
Wonchul Shin
phasized the role of Chaebol owners or entrepreneurs from a market-ori-
ented perspective. Strangely enough, both views are often combined at the 
same time. This paper has gone beyond the discussion of success factors 
to examine how the relationship between the government and the market 
has changed and the difficulties and problems that shipyard workers had 
to face in the process. In particular, the paper has focused on the govern-
ment’s policy for the shipbuilding crisis. 
Under the military dictatorships the government helped the ship-
building industry to secure international competitiveness through ex-
port finance, the creation of demand through planned shipbuilding, and 
the suppression of the labor movement and their protests. When a ship-
yard went to into bankruptcy due to a prolonged recession, the govern-
ment revived it through massive financial aid. Those policies showed the 
typical characteristics of industrial policies of  the developmental states. 
The Korean government’s industrial policy shifted significantly towards 
neo-liberalism in 1997. Instead of the preference for foreign loans over 
foreign direct investment under the developmental period, the Korean 
government allowed all types of inward and outward capital flows since 
1998. As the Korean big shipyards are strongly competitive, the  govern-
ment promoted the liberalization of investment and financialization, which 
has acted as a factor inducing over-investment in the industry during the 
2000s (Shin 2016). 
Under the shipbuilding recession after the global financial crisis 
of 2008, the Korean government pushed for financial-led restructuring. 
Government officials emphasized market principles, which in fact placed 
the interests of creditors and shareholders at the top of all priorities (Ji 
2011). As for the restructuring of the shipbuilding industry, shipyard 
unions were not invited to the table for consultation at all. The govern-
ment and creditors asked unions to sign a workforce reduction agreement 
in exchange for financial assistance. 
Direct hired regular workers at large shipyards, organized by 
means of labor unions, managed to minimize job cuts and secure some 
compensation for voluntary redundancy, But internal subcontract workers 
have suffered massive layoffs without any compensation. This division 
of workers is still a major impediment for the prospects of the workers’ 
movement in the shipyard. 
Korea`s shipbuilding industry is highly exposed to the risks of 
fluctuations in the world economy. Since the 2000s instability in the new 
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shipbuilding market has increased, and there have been weaker employ-
ment protection measures, as neoliberal policy and discourse spread in 
South Korea. The social pains and inefficiency caused by the restructur-
ing of the shipbuilding industries over the past decade were neither inev-
itable nor fair. The design of socially responsible restructuring policies 
and institutions also remains a challenge for the Korean labour move-
ment. Furthermore, shipyard workers’ union cannot but think over poli-
cies and institutions for regulating speculative investment in the shipping 
and shipbuilding industries. The principle of industrial democracy, which 
makes it possible for labor unions to participate in the government’s pol-
icymaking process, would be of prime importance for the all shipyard 
workers,  including internal subcontract workers. 
Incorporating Daewoo Shipbuilding under a new holding com-
pany and putting HHI under the control of multi-tier holding company 
will be another hurdle for the expansion of industrial democracy in the 
Korean shipbuilding industry. Sustainable corporate governance would be 
an essential condition for large global companies and the government’s 
industrial policy should also support it.
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